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My Dear Student: 
The other day you broached the idea that constitutional law is 
"just politics." You described your comment as "realistic." Ever 
since our discussion, I have wanted to amplify my response. I can 
give you some books, but in the meantime here is my preface. 
I told you that I am sympathetic to your idea, "but . . . . " On 
reflection, it seems to me that the "buts" outweigh the general prop-
osition. I'm tempted to say that "constitutional law isn't politics, 
but . . . . " In either case, the qualifications are crucial. 
First an aside. Most of the decisions in your casebook are hard 
cases at the periphery of doctrine. Hard cases force you to think 
about the contours of the doctrines; you learn more about the nu-
ances of free speech by discussing Miller and Schenck than by de-
nouncing the Inquisition. Nevertheless, I have some qualms. By 
concentrating on the periphery, we tend to trivialize the Bill of 
Rights. Its chief significance is not what it says about Mr. Cohen's 
jacket. From that perspective, it might be preferable to study the 
Inquisition. 
There's also something to be said for studying easy cases. In 
other fields, we usually learn by beginning with the simple and 
working gradually toward the complex. Law schools force us to 
reverse this natural sequence: you read a tough case and try to infer 
what are the easy cases. In Constitutional Law, this usually isn't 
too difficult. But there's a third problem. At the periphery, most 
constitutional doctrines are a muddle of confusion and inconsis-
tency. Casebooks, devoted to the periphery, create the impression 
that there's no law in constitutional law. This impression is en-
hanced by our teaching method, which inculcates radical skepticism 
about all claims to legal truth. "If there's no law," you may think, 
"it must all be politics." But most constitutional questions are sim-
pler than the ones in the casebooks, and at any given time they 
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usually have a fairly clear answer. Justices Brennan and Rehnquist 
would agree about the answers to most of the man in the street's 
constitutional questions. It is only in the hardest cases that they so 
often disagree. (If you doubt this, consider the fact that the Justices 
unanimously agree in seventy percent of all docketed cases that the 
questions presented do not even deserve conference discussion.) 
I 
The idea that constitutional law is politics expresses several im-
portant truths. You know that Presidents select Justices for politi-
cal (though not necessarily ideological) reasons; that constitutional 
cases often involve controversial questions of public policy; and that 
a judge's attitude toward these questions is usually strongly colored 
by his or her political orientation. Like politicians, the Justices 
must choose among conflicting values. Like a legislature, the Court 
waffles and compromises when it is ambivalent. Like serious politi-
cians, the Justices should care about the social consequences of their 
decisions. Like all politicians, they take account of public opinion, 
though with life tenure they are freer to take unpopular positions, as 
in Lochner and school busing, and they sometimes wield power long 
after the political climate in which they were appointed has 
changed. 
Scholarly interest in the political aspect of law originated as a 
rebellion against the simplicities of the traditional theory of law as 
an impersonal set of rules that judges look up. Like all intellectual 
rebellions, it ran the risk of replacing one oversimplification with 
another. The political side of constitutional law, though fundamen-
tal, is only one side. Again, we scholars have not always empha-
sized the legal side, perhaps because it seems too obvious. We do 
discuss doctrinal consistency, of course, especially in law school. 
But those discussions are often more calculated to erode than to 
inculcate respect for the Court's legal function. That function is not 
solely a matter of respect for precedent; it has more basic aspects. 
As you know, the Justices usually do not take instructions-or even 
advice-about individual cases from their political allies in the 
other branches of government. On the rare occasions when we de-
tect something close to this, we condemn it. If constitutional law 
were simply politics, a Justice would know that failure to vote with 
his party might be penalized; he might be assigned nothing but 
water law opinions for the rest of his career. In some foreign sys-
tems, analogous things have happened. President Plutarco Calles of 
Mexico warded off intervention by the United States Marines by 
agreeing to rescind the expropriation of American oil companies' 
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property. Afraid to take responsibility for cancelling the popular 
expropriation decrees, he instructed the Mexican Supreme Court to 
solve the problem. The court obligingly declared unconstitutional 
those portions of the petroleum law that limited pre-1917 conces-
sions to fifty years. To say that constitutional law "is politics" im-
plies an indifference to whether our Court functions in this way. 
By the same token, if constitutional law were just politics, indi-
vidual Justices would regularly cast their votes so as to advance 
their political careers. But allegations of such behavior are rare, 
and few Justices even aspire to post-Court careers. 
Another difference between constitutional law and politics is 
that all of the Justices believe in a certain kind of impartiality: once 
a Justice decides, say, that there is a constitutional right to make 
campaign contributions, she will take the same position in the next 
case raising that issue, even if the next case involves a member of 
the opposing party. In this extremely important sense, the Court 
does indeed apply "neutral principles." Politicians sometimes be-
have even-handedly, but what we think of as political conduct is 
quite different. For politicians, party loyalty is common; for judges, 
it is exceptional. To be sure, ideological bias often influences a Jus-
tice's initial commitment to a legal rule, but such bias is much less 
decisive in determining how he or she votes in cases involving appli-
cation of the rule. A judge may bend a rule from time to time, 
usually out of sympathy for a litigant rather than partisan "polit-
ical" loyalty. But even this is unusual. More commonly, judges 
believe that freedom is indivisible, that if Democrats and fascists are 
to speak freely, Republicans and communists must be allowed the 
same right. 
The very nature of the judicial system affects the wisdom-the 
political wisdom, if you like-of constitutional decisions. Judging 
has a political element, but it is also a craft. That, of course, is also 
true of such undoubtedly political activities as diplomacy and 
legislating. 
Let me give an illustration from the standing cases that you 
read in the course. If you will study the various opinions in Flast 
and Valley Forge, I think you will agree with me that none of the 
other Justices did as well as Justice Harlan in enunciating a coher-
ent and well-reasoned approach to standing. This is far from being 
a purely academic matter; a major function of a judicial opinion is 
to explain the result in a way that will enable lawyers to plan their 
clients' affairs. Perhaps lawyers attach too much weight to that 
function, and so to the intellectual quality of opinions. It would be 
surprising if we didn't. Still, bad opinions sometimes lead to bad 
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legal advice; and bad legal advice does cause problems. Judged by 
that criterion, Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Flast was poor 
even if you like the political implications of a lenient approach to 
standing. 
Because I value the legal side of constitutional law, I want it to 
appear in our accounts of how the Court functions. To omit it is 
sloppy; and perhaps it is even slightly ominous. Much of what 
passes for realism in modem social thought is to the effect that cer-
tain ideological pillars of liberal democracy-consent, freedom, the 
rule of law-are mythical. As indeed they are-in part. But the 
difference between a partial myth and a complete myth is the differ-
ence between Abraham Lincoln and the tooth fairy. A jurisprudent 
once wrote of the "normative power" of what exists, our tendency 
to believe that what is, is proper. If we ever accept the idea that law 
is nothing but politics, we may cease to be shocked by the equation. 
When we cease to be shocked by it, we may be ready to accept a 
society in which it is more nearly true. 
As usual, the falsehood is in the innuendoes. To say that con-
stitutional law is "just politics" has a dismissive innuendo. It im-
plies that the objections to judicial activism are merely hair-splitting 
legalism, that the political outcomes of cases are what matter. 
Much can be said for the essential soundness of this position. It 
compares favorably, I think, with the jurisprudential platitudes of 
strict constructionists. I will define a strict constructionist as some-
one who thinks that the trouble with activist Justices is that they 
aren't following the Constitution. The conservatives who make this 
charge today are sometimes sophisticated about other matters, but 
their jurisprudence is naive. They seem to believe that judging is a 
simple task, requiring moral integrity and common sense, but de-
void of intellectual subtlety. This is nonsense. Most of the subjec-
tivity in constitutional adjudication is inevitable. Even if the Court 
were to abolish substantive due process, the right to privacy, and 
other doctrines that lack a solid textual foundation, it would be left 
with an enormous residue of opportunities for judicial activism: the 
equal protection clause; various kinds of procedural due process; 
the ninth amendment; redefinitions of the meaning of "cases" and 
"controversies"; the contract clause; the just compensation clause; 
the commerce clause; the separation of powers; and so on-not to 
mention values such as federalism that are implicit in the constitu-
tional design. It is true, no doubt, that activist Justices see what 
they want to see in these clauses; but that is less because they are 
activist than because they are partisan. Most activism is well 
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enough grounded in the Constitution to survive any purely legalistic 
attack. 
The question whether we should obey the framers' intentions is 
like the question whether the War of Independence was justifiable: 
interesting but impractical. As you know, we often cannot tell how 
the framers would have responded to a modern issue--or even an 
old one. Sometimes, as in the case of the first amendment, their 
language supports a broader right than they apparently meant to 
create. In other cases, words like "unreasonable" (fourth amend-
ment) or "equal" (fourteenth amendment) invite subjective inter-
pretation. In some areas, historians periodically come up with new 
interpretations of the framers' attitudes. 
No political faction wants constitutional law to follow the 
framers' intentions closely, except when its own causes are thereby 
advanced. Probably most of us aren't conscious hypocrites about 
this, but history shows that strict construction, like states' rights, is 
rarely valued-or abhorred-for its own sake. Any principled op-
ponent of judicial activism would object to the freewheeling protec-
tion of property interests in some state courts, with scant textual 
justification in the state constitutions, but few care about that-cer-
tainly conservative polemicists have not complained. Nor have they 
protested the role of the United States Supreme Court under the 
commerce clause, striking down laws on essentially legislative 
grounds, with dubious warrant in the Constitution. 
Furthermore, powerful arguments can be adduced in favor of 
going beyond the narrow intentions of the framers, in cases like 
Brown and Baker v. Carr, without endorsing the idea that judges 
should be guided simply by their political beliefs. The notion of 
"evolving standards" may have been invoked too often, but it is not 
intrinsically bad. It was Justice Holmes, not Justice Brennan, who 
wrote the opinion in Missouri v. Holland. And who would want the 
constitutionality of censoring Ulysses to turn on eighteenth-century 
ideas about law, sex, and literature? 
II 
The Court's critics have always been inclined to describe deci-
sions with which they disagree as usurpations. Occasionally they 
are right, but most bad or controversial decisions are not truly law-
less. To make my argument more concrete, here's a hypothetical 
case. Suppose the Court were to create "a constitutional right to a 
decent environment" under the due process clause. (In the sixties, 
some environmentalists wanted precisely that.) Conservatives, we 
may safely assume, would attack this new right as an outrageous 
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usurpation, an illegitimate use of judicial power, a substitution of 
the Justices' own political preferences for the Constitution they are 
supposed to apply. 
On what ground could they support such a charge? The most 
obvious legal argument would be that pollution, even in "excessive" 
amounts, does not deny anyone "life, liberty, or property without 
due process oflaw," unless these words are given a bizarre meaning. 
As an original question, I would have found this argument un-
answerable. However indistinct the Constitution's meaning may be, 
some issues are amenable to resolution in the ordinary, legalistic 
way, if that is what we want to do. I think this was such an issue. 
The clause is ambiguous, but only as to the nature of the procedural 
right it establishes, not as to whether it also establishes substantive 
rights. As Holmes might have put it, the due process clause did not 
enact Mr. Aldo Leopold's Sand County Almanac. 
There are, to be sure, a couple of minor textual complexities. 
Respectable scholars have said that the privileges or immunities 
clause of the fourteenth amendment was meant to protect ill-de-
fined substantive rights. It certainly would be stretching legal logic 
to use this as a basis for a right to a decent environment; and yet-
once we reject the idea that the framers' immediate concerns con-
trol-there is at least a tiny foothold here for conventional legal 
argument. Unsound, I think, but perhaps not quite frivolous. The 
same can be said of the theory that new substantive rights may be 
grounded in the ninth amendment. 
More important, the Court long ago rejected the narrow, pro-
cedural interpretation of due process. I think that the invention of 
substantive due process was a usurpation. But when the Court ap-
plies the doctrine today the usurpation issue is clouded by time and 
precedent. The wrong of a usurpation may linger on for a while, 
but it is steadily diluted by competing considerations of tradition 
and stability. Overthrow a rightful king and sooner or later you 
will have a new rightful king. Even if Marbury was a usurpation, 
which I doubt, it would be wrong to say that therefore all subse-
quent invalidations of acts of Congress were usurpations. Even if 
the Court's assumption of a power to nullify state legislation under 
the "dormant" commerce clause was a usurpation, as it certainly 
was from a strict constructionist perspective, no sensible critic says 
that therefore recent commerce decisions must be usurpations. 
They may be harmful; they may be based on an unwise conception 
of the judicial role; but they are legitimate. 
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Like it or not, judicial activism is self-legitimating. 1 It is a 
legal commonplace that the decisions interpreting a statute or Con-
stitution are part of the law that a court is bound to follow until 
they have been overruled; by conventional lawyers' logic, it is just as 
improper to ignore the cases as it is to ignore the text-more so if, 
as is usual, the cases bear more closely on the problem at hand. To 
reject this method, as the Court's critics often do, is to reject the 
legal model in favor of the political. (Which is ironical, since "polit-
ical judging" is what the critics say they dislike.) A politician, of 
course, doesn't worry much about whether the legislature's treat-
ment of Problem B is consistent in principle with its treatment last 
year of Problem A. His goal is to win as many battles as he can. 
Some Justices behave more or less the same way, and this is one of 
the explanations of the confused state of constitutional doctrine, to-
day and in earlier eras. Given the passions that constitutional issues 
arouse, it is understandable that the Justices-"conservatives" as 
well as "liberals" -have often valued victory more than consis-
tency: dealing with great public issues, one is reluctant to accept all 
the implications of stare decisis. 
Until the Court is prepared to abandon substantive due pro-
cess, no purely textual argument against a right to a decent environ-
ment will be tenable. Arguing against the proposed right, it would 
be much better to point out that the substantive due process deci-
sions, audacious though they were, did not build a bridge between 
the constitutional text and a right to a decent environment. They 
are suggestive of some sort of libertarian right-in educational, sex-
ual, and reproductive matters-but not of environmental rights. 
On this ground, one could argue that environmental rights are not a 
logical next step in the evolution of constitutional law. That is an 
accusation of bad craftsmanship, but not of illegitimacy or usurpa-
tion, at least not in any ordinary sense. 
I prefer to stress a more fundamental criticism. The case 
against judicial imperialism rests less on conventional lawyers' logic 
than on a commitment to self-government. The idea that the Jus-
tices are bound by the law is one way to express that commitment, 
because it seeks to eliminate their discretion and confine them to a 
mechanical role. They are not to make law, but only to apply it. In 
constitutional interpretation, as you know, that attractive idea is 
unrealistic. (It is not wholly realistic even as applied to statutory 
interpretation.) A better approach, endorsed by many thoughtful 
scholars, is to assess the relative institutional competence of courts 
I. For a discussion of this and related themes, see Glazer, Lawyers. the New Class, and 
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and legislatures in particular fields. John Hart Ely, for example, 
argues that the judicial function under the Constitution ought to be 
confined to making democracy work, to dealing with problems that 
for one reason or another are unsuitable for resolution in the ordi-
nary, political way. 
Scholars like Ely are writing footnotes-in his case a magnifi-
cent footnote-to James Bradley Thayer. But they usually do not 
make the same argument that he did. Thayer gave a distinctive 
twist to the idea that judicial review is undemocratic: 
[T]he power of the judiciary to disregard unconstitutional legislation ... is always 
attended with a serious evil, namely, that the correction of legislative mistakes 
comes from the outside, and the people thus lose the political experience, and the 
moral education and stimulus that comes from fighting the questions out in the 
ordinary way, and correcting their own errors .... The tendency of a common and 
easy resort to this great function, now lamentably too common, is to dwarf the 
political capacity of the people, and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility.2 
Nearly a century has passed since Thayer wrote those lines, 
and the literature about judicial review has become almost embar-
rassingly vast. Much of it is about how to reconcile judicial review 
with democracy. Yet Thayer's unassuming little paragraph, which 
seems to be about that subject, has lost little of its originality. Evi-
dently, he was expressing a thought that does not come readily to 
the twentieth-century mind. 
What was it? In the quoted passage, he was not drawing a 
bright line between just and unjust decisions, as so many have tried 
to do, saying "listen to me and you will learn how to apply the 
equal protection clause." He was not saying that judges should 
stick to the constitutional text, or what the framers would have 
wished, or principles derived from the Constitution or from our his-
tory and traditions. Nor that judicial activism squanders the 
Court's political capital, or is tyrannical, illicit, lawless, or unprinci-
pled. Nor that legislatures are more responsive than judges to the 
people's will. Any or all of these may be true, but they are not his 
message. Nor did he offer the familiar syllogism that since we are a 
democracy, and judicial activism is undemocratic, it contradicts the 
premise of our system. (He knew very well that the Constitution 
did not create a pure democracy.) He did not seek to persuade us 
that activist judges are disingenuous, that they enforce their own 
values in the guise of constitutional interpretation. Nor that they 
are less competent than legislators to decide certain kinds of ques-
tions. His point was not precisely that "liberty lies in the hearts of 
men and women" and therefore cannot ultimately be secured by 
2. J. THAYER, 0. HOLMES & F. FRANKFURTER ON JOHN MARSHALL 85-86 (1967). 
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courts. The passage does not say that activism invades legislative or 
popular prerogatives, or that it cannot be reconciled with demo-
cratic theory. 
Thayer was not talking about democratic theory or legitimacy. 
He was talking about political sloth and liberty. Not democracy as 
some talismanic, formal assurance of propriety or legitimacy, but 
democracy as training for self-government. Not that activist judges 
deprive the people of their rights, but that all judges-especially 
activists-relieve the people of their responsibilities. It is a practi-
cal, political argument, owing more to the Greeks than to the com-
mon lawyers. We should be leery, says Thayer, of too much judicial 
governance, because it tends to unfit us for citizenship. Insidiously, 
it habituates us to petitioning a supreme law-giver, remote and un-
touchable. It steers us away from the sweaty arena where coalitions 
are built, compromises struck, and ballots counted. It tells us that 
we need not deal with those outside our circle, listening to their 
testimony, persuading the undecided, exchanging questions and 
shouts, yielding an amendment here, offering a return favor there. 
Carried too far, it weakens the habits that sustain self-government. 
Like Brandeis, Thayer told us that responsibility is the forge of 
character, and character is the basis of freedom. 
This was a radically different approach to judicial review from 
those with which we are familiar. In our debates, both sides assume 
that the issue is in some sense legal. The differences in their answers 
obscure the fact that they all ask the same question: what is the 
legitimate scope of judicial review? We usually assume that if a de-
cision is substantively wise as public policy, and justifiable as a mat-
ter of constitutional interpretation, then it is good. Fifty good 
decisions are better than one. Accordingly, we ask what the judges 
are entitled to do under provisions such as the due process clause. 
Thayer did not deny the necessity of this inquiry, but he denied its 
sufficiency. What Thayer implies is that even if the Justices are en-
titled to intervene, in the sense that no defensible canon of legal 
reasoning precludes it, perhaps they should not do so. And even if 
they should intervene, a price must be paid. In individual cases, the 
price may be small; cumulatively it may be great. So if some wizard 
historian were to prove beyond any doubt that the framers wanted 
the Court to be twice as interventionist as it has ever been, even if 
she were to find a lost clause saying "the Justices are to rule in 
accordance with their values," we should not rejoice. Government 
by judiciary at some point becomes bad politics even when it is good 
law and good legislative policy. That was Thayer's great insight. 
It is not an insight that many of us are likely to embrace. It 
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sounds as quaint as the blue remembered hills of Emerson's 
America: church spires, farm chores, town meetings. "Responsi-
bility" and "moral education" are not words that come readily to 
our lips; they sound vaguely reactionary. Our messianic political 
culture glories in rights-the more the better. When the Supreme 
Court refuses to create a new right, the media treat it as a decision 
on the legislative merits, and not infrequently proceed to denounce 
it as a novel threat to our ancient liberties. Diversity, as such, is not 
one of our ideals. Neither is local government. Our very concept of 
a right is violated if a couple of backwater states do not recognize it. 
Born in Nebraska, reared in New Jersey, teaching in Los Angeles, 
the typical intellectual has no roots in a community. We want na-
tional solutions, and we want them clean, without the difficulties 
and compromises of legislation. We might concede that at some 
hypothetical point a profusion of rights would become excessive, 
like a toxic dose of sugar, but few are likely to believe that the law is 
anywhere near that point. 
Are we wrong? It is difficult to tell. Thayer's argument cannot 
be rigorously proved or disproved. It resembles, in this respect, the 
idea that "the death penalty brutalizes us." Those who reject 
Thayer can point to the fact that the Constitution controls only a 
tiny fraction of our public life. It has little to do with the produc-
tion and distribution of wealth, or national defense, which are after 
all the basic political issues. On the other hand, the courts are in-
volved in several of the issues about which political activists care 
most intensely-abortion, capital punishment, church-state rela-
tions, campaign spending regulations, pornography, vulgar speech, 
women's rights, school busing, reverse discrimination. Even in 
some of the contexts where they have not yet imposed a national 
solution, the mere prospect that they may do so after new Justices 
are appointed probably induces some political lethargy. 
For those of us who dislike that trend, Thayer offers a perspec-
tive that is superior in several ways to the more narrowly legalistic 
case for judicial restraint. In the first place, Thayer is more realis-
tic. He does not claim that anything short of pure democracy is 
anomalous in America. He does not deny, as strict constructionists 
often seem to do, the inevitable subjective element in constitutional 
interpretation, but he also does not deny that at some point an inter-
pretation is indeed too subjective. He does not brush aside the addi-
tional complexities of dealing with precedents, particularly those 
with which the judge does not agree. He does not ask the Justices 
to do something of which they are incapable: just as he recom-
mends, some decisions seem to have been influenced by a sense of 
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democratic proprieties. (Admittedly, this is difficult to distinguish 
from other motives, especially political prudence.) In any event, one 
cannot rebut Thayer by citing cases where the Court ignored his 
advice, because Thayer (unlike the strict constructionists) was not 
making a conventional legal argument, and therefore had no need 
to distinguish precedents. In Thayer's terms the issue is political (in 
the best sense), and political questions-whether to go to war, 
whether to socialize medicine-cannot sensibly be analyzed in a le-
galistic manner. One does not refute a maxim of good govern-
ment-fiscal integrity, for example-by showing that it has often or 
even usually been ignored. (Unless the "mistake" was always 
harmless, which is impossible to demonstrate in this context.) 
This is a major difference between Thayer and the strict con-
structionists. Suppose, for example, that the Court refuses to estab-
lish a right to a decent environment, while also refusing to overrule 
Pierce, Meyer, Griswold, Roe, and other substantive due process de-
cisions. I think that it would be foolish to applaud the Court's envi-
ronmental decision on the ground that it was faithful to the framers' 
intent. What good would it do to follow the framers in one case? 
Unless the answer is reminiscent of Thayer, it will be unpersuasive. 
The only other justification for following the framers' intentions 
presumably would be legal convention ("this is how courts are sup-
posed to interpret authoritative texts") and social contract ("this 
was the covenant in 1789"). The theory, in other words, is that the 
Justices should follow the framers' intent because that is a rule of 
the game. Conventions, contracts, and rules of the game by their 
very nature admit of few exceptions. A rule of the game has to be 
followed fairly consistently or it ceases to be such. Without a mas-
sive uprooting of constitutional law, which no competent observer 
expects, trying to follow the framers' intentions cannot be described 
as a canon of constitutional jurisprudence. The Court often does so, 
but rarely if ever where one supposes that it would otherwise reach 
a different result. The framers' intentions do not appear to deter-
mine the outcomes of cases, and this is so irrespective of whether 
the Court is controlled by liberals or by conservatives. 
A political virtue, by contrast, is not wholly vitiated by incon-
sistency or rarity of application. If it is good for us to fight our 
environmental battles in the halls of politics, then the Court can 
achieve that good by refusing to intervene in the political process. 
Its failure to show similar restraint in earlier cases is unfortunate, 
but does not detract from today's achievement. If the Court follows 
Thayer's advice in one case every ten years, that is better than noth-
ing, just as some careful diplomacy is better than none. If the Jus-
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tices ever become more restrained, they are not necessarily obliged 
to overrule their previous mistakes. Those transgressions are rele-
vant to today's cases only if they are on point as legal precedents in 
the conventional sense; as transgressions, they are irrelevant. For 
conservative, Burkean reasons, the Court may decide not to over-
rule an excessively activist decision that has become part of the 
fabric of constitutional law. If it chooses that course, the old deci-
sion should not be ignored in deciding cases that are definitely 
within the scope of its rationale. Beyond that, the old case does not 
justify excessive activism today, any more than a foolish war in 
1976 would justify a foolish war in 1986. 
Thayer's argument would not lose its power even if all the le-
galistic problems were solved, for instance by a constitutional 
amendment that explicitly created "a right to a decent environ-
ment." A strict constructionist might object to such a proposal on 
substantive grounds, as by saying that it would increase the price of 
electricity. Apart from that, what could he say? The amendment, 
duly enacted, would solve the usurpation problem. Once enacted, it 
could reasonably be given a broad interpretation; neither its lan-
guage nor its purpose would suggest the propriety of a narrow one. 
Thayer, on the other hand, would have had no difficulty arguing 
against adoption of the amendment (even if he were an environ-
mentalist), or against an expansive interpretation of it. 
Thayer's approach helps us to see that the current debate about 
judicial activism is much too legalistic. We deplore the "formal-
ism" of strict constructionists, but we have our own brand of for-
malism-I'll call it the New Formalism. For example, some have 
sought to justify activism by reference to Congress's power over the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It would be wrong, they con-
cede, for the Justices to lay down whatever rules they please, not 
bound by law, and answerable to no electoral constituency. But the 
Constitution itself solves this problem: article III empowers Con-
gress to limit the Court's jurisdiction. If Congress is displeased by a 
decision, it may withdraw the Court's jurisdiction over that type of 
case. Since Congress represents the people, to be answerable to 
Congress is to be answerable to the people. Therefore, the argu-
ment goes, the Court is ultimately answerable to the people. It fol-
lows that the Court's role, however large and however free from 
legal constraints, is consistent with democracy. 
There are several flaws in this argument. The Court has not 
yet determined whether Congress's power over its "jurisdiction" 
may be used to nullify specific decisions. Many scholars believe 
that it may not. Even if the power is broad, its exercise may create 
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severe practical problems.3 But the most fundamental reason for 
rejecting this solution is that it is too legalistic. If we were discuss-
ing a contract, we might look for an agent (Congress) that could 
bind the principal (the people). But we are not discussing a con-
tract; we are discussing the vigor of democracy. The question is not 
whether some elective body has acquiesced in judicial control. It is, 
rather, whether judicial control will tend to enfeeble the democratic 
spirit. That is a political, not a legal question. We do not answer it 
by citing a document, parsing a clause, tracing a line of precedents 
or finding a waiver of rights. We answer it by considering political 
realities. 
If Congress has acquiesced, that is all the more reason for 
alarm. Politicians are only too happy to let the courts assume con-
trol of the most dangerous political issues, ones on which their con-
stituents are sharply and intensely divided. If they can avoid it, 
they do not wish to be accountable to the voters on these issues. 
One way to try to avoid accountability is by voting against a juris-
diction-limiting bill, giving constitutional or institutional explana-
tions, while professing sympathy for the substance of the bill. Or 
they may be quite sincerely troubled by the implications of limiting 
the Court's jurisdiction. The fundamental point remains: politi-
cians should not be allowed to waive their proper role in our sys-
tem. We may quarrel about the boundary of that role, but wherever 
it is, it cannot be altered by politicians who like the kitchen but not 
the heat. The reasons for Thayer's admonition do not become less 
persuasive when the legislature is apathetic, or even when the peo-
ple themselves would be glad to let the courts run the country. 
Excessive formalism also permeates another effort to justify ju-
dicial activism: the theory that the framers created an open-ended 
Constitution. In one version, the theory is that the ninth amend-
ment was a delegation of lawmaking power to the courts.4 Again, 
one can raise cogent legal objections to this argument, but a deeper 
problem exists. At most, the idea of an open-ended Constitution 
answers the strict constructionists; it purports to refute legalistic ob-
jections to activism based on the language and original meaning of 
the Constitution. It does not answer Thayer, unless the scholars are 
able to show that the Constitution behind the Constitution leaves no 
political discretion to the Justices. This, of course, is the opposite of 
3. See Auerbach, Book Review, I CONST. COMM. 137, 158-63 (1984). This review has 
heavily influenced my own thoughts about judicial review. 
4. The ninth amendment says, "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Professor Charles 
Black is the foremost proponent of using it as a basis for new rights. For an able response, see 
Van Alstyne, Book Review, 91 YALE L.J. 207 (1981). 
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what they want to show; the rights in the Constitution behind the 
Constitution are to be defined by the Justices. If so, they are free to 
follow all sorts of political thinkers, including Thayer. 
The same logic applies to opaque phrases like the equal protec-
tion clause, the privileges or immunities clause, and "cases or con-
troversies." Trying to arrive at defensible, narrow interpretations of 
these clauses on the basis of their language and the framers' intent is 
at best exceedingly difficult. For a Justice who respects precedent, 
the task is even more daunting. But it is not at all difficult to find 
some claims that should be rejected on Thayer's ground. 
III 
Of course, Thayer's generalization is not a litmus test for de-
ciding individual cases. One of the limitations of his idea-which is 
also one of its virtues-is that it does not purport to be a criterion 
for deciding individual cases. It is, rather, a criterion for assessing 
the tendency of the Court's performance as a whole, not only in bad 
decisions, but also in those that may be justifiable from a narrowly 
legal point of view. Thayer did not pretend that democracy is the 
only valid criterion for evaluating constitutional decisions; we must 
also consider the text, the precedents, policy arguments. Even so, 
Thayer is not irrelevant to particular decisions. He helps us to 
frame a critical issue: is there, in this type of case, an adequate 
justification for removing the controversy from the regular political 
arena? 
This is a question of degree. Thayer did not suggest that the 
Court should tolerate plain violations of constitutional guarantees, 
for instance a law forbidding "speeches and publications by Repub-
licans." Under Marbury, the courts must declare that law unconsti-
tutional. Not only does it obviously violate the first amendment, it 
does so in a way that makes Thayer's preference for democratic 
solutions inapplicable. For if Republicans are not allowed to make 
speeches, they cannot speak against the law. The law itself thus 
severely inhibits the political contest that Thayer envisioned. 
Most cases, of course, are not so easy. One may believe, for 
example, that "one man, one vote" is an unwise political aspiration. 
If so, the Court's reapportionment decisions went too far. But if the 
Court's aspiration was wise, then judicial intervention was not an 
inappropriate way to attain it, because malapportionment tends to 
be self-perpetuating. 
Following the famous footnote four in Caro/ene Products, most 
scholars have agreed that "discrete and insular minorities" also 
need judicial protection. To take an extreme case: it would have 
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been absurd to tell Mr. Korematsu to organize a political campaign. 
Given the popular attitude toward criminal defendants, the same 
can be said, though with less force, of Mr. Gideon. Of course, this 
does not necessarily mean that Gideon deserved to win his case; 
only that Thayer's argument was less cogent in Gideon than in some 
other cases. 
Stereotypes about political disadvantage should be applied with 
great caution, however, even in criminal, racial and religious cases. 
In some contexts, minorities are on both sides of the issue: while 
violent criminals are disproportionately black, so are their victims. 
In many contexts, minorities make up for their lack of numbers by 
greater sensitivity and cohesiveness, or allies in the majority, or by 
combining with other minorities. Nobody has less power than a 
condemned man, yet opponents of capital punishment (like their 
foes) have great political power. Even in Minneapolis, most Irish 
Catholics or Jews may be more prosperous and better connected 
than most Lutherans.5 Homosexuals are a minority, abhorred and 
persecuted since Biblical times, but between 1961 and 1986 about 
half the states abolished laws against homosexual sodomy. 
The Bakke case illustrates the crudity of conventional stereo-
types. One can make a pretty good argument for judicial interven-
tion in Bakke, even though Bakke was not part of what we usually 
mean by a "discrete and insular minority." In most universities, 
racial minorities have a good deal of political clout-nothing wrong 
with that. It is relatively safe for a faculty to ignore the interests of 
people like Bakke-disorganized, not yet in the school, generally 
unaware why they were not admitted, and preoccupied with finish-
ing their education. Some of the whites who were admitted must 
have sympathized with Bakke, but they too were busy, and they 
were closer socially and professionally to the black students who 
were admitted than to the whites who were not. Although he was 
white, male, and middle-class, Bakke was at a political dis-
advantage. 
Of course, political disadvantage is not the end of the inquiry. 
On the constitutional merits, one might decide that racial prefer-
ences are unwise, and yet vote to defer to the university's decision. 
Discrimination against whites, though it may be unjust and undesir-
able, is much less vicious than what was done to blacks. A judge 
might believe, with Holmes, that he should be reluctant to declare 
unconstitutional a program that many reasonable people believe is 
desirable, especially if the judge thinks that they are not utterly irra-
5. See Why Are Blacks Paid Less? I CoNST. CoMM. 191 (1984) for some surpri~ing 
data on income by ethnic group. 
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tional in so believing. The judge might also believe, as I do, that 
diversity, freedom, and the individual responsibility they promote 
are constitutional virtues, not to be lightly overridden by a 5-4 (or 
4-1-4) edict from Washington. It is "moral education," Thayer 
might have said, for thousands of professors and deans to bear re-
sponsibility for deciding between the claims of the Bakkes and the 
claims of the racial minorities. If it had been up to me, I might not 
have been persuaded by Thayer's logic in the context of Bakke. For 
I believe that preferential admissions are harmful, especially to the 
ostensible beneficiaries. But Bakke at least illustrates that Thayer's 
advice does not always favor the "conservative" side, and that "con-
servative" norms sometimes point in different directions. Most of 
all, it illustrates the folly of treating footnote four as a substitute for 
thought. 
A common "realistic" argument is that judicial restraint is es-
sentially a position on the merits, since it determines the result. 
This argument proves too much, for the same can often be said of 
democracy in general: by choosing a democratic system we have 
foreclosed dozens if not hundreds of policies that are possible only 
under a dictatorship--for example ruthless collectivism, a large 
peacetime army, or abolition of social security. To be a democrat is 
to accept that price. Of course, there is a sense in which a court 
that upholds the legislature's resolution of an issue is influencing the 
outcome by upholding the outcome. But if this truism is to be more 
than a shallow semantic point, one must show that it is more impor-
tant to solve the problem "correctly" than to solve it dem-
ocratically. 
Now what about environmental rights? Again, judicial activ-
ists can make an impressive argument that the political process is 
seriously flawed. The politicians are often swayed by corporate 
money; they find dozens of ways to avoid accountability; they re-
spond to irate property owners much more readily than to amateurs 
with a cause; they sometimes sacrifice the well-being of our de-
scendants for the sake of today's voters; they mirror the parochial 
interests of their little constituencies-a city, a county, even a state 
government does not adequately respond to environmental issues 
that transcend political boundaries. The government sometimes has 
a vested interest in environmental degradation-witness the Army 
Corps of Engineers. Even the most conscientious bureaucrats, 
charged with environmental responsibilities, often must placate 
politicians who control their appropriations, and who in tum are 
controlled by constituents-from county governments to farmers to 
timber companies-that fiercely resist even reasonable regulations. 
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Nevertheless, I am against creation of a right to a decent envi-
ronment. While conceding that some major exceptions should be 
made to Thayer's prescription, we should not forget that politics is 
always unfair in some sense. The winners invariably have some 
"improper" advantages: more money; incumbency; the greed, prej-
udice, and ignorance of the populace; the personal characteristics of 
the politicians (disproportionately male, middle-class, white, law-
yers, and so on), or of the members of key committees (your scenic 
rivers bill may need the approval of the farmers who control the 
"Agriculture and Natural Resources" committee, or of a finance 
committee dominated by conservatives); the myriad difficulties of 
amateur lobbying; the fact that legislative procedures make it far 
easier to block legislation than to pass it. If Thayer's prescription is 
to apply at all, it must apply to many issues where the political 
contest is arguably unfair. 
Usually, both sides will have some unfair advantages. (One's 
own advantages always seem eminently just, if indeed they are not 
taken to be signs of divine approbation.) In the sixties and early 
seventies environmentalists, though severely handicapped in other 
ways, were borne aloft by one of the most spectacular tidal waves of 
publicity in American history. My prejudices are with the 
backpackers, but there's no denying that the publicity was mas-
sively one-sided. For ten years or so relatively few journalists or 
authors raised such questions as the effect of environmental regula-
tions on utility and housing costs. Although we do not normally 
describe literature as an "unfair advantage," this free publicity must 
have been worth billions of dollars. True or false, fair or unfair, it 
certainly served to offset many of the advantages of those who re-
sisted regulations. In consequence, many strict environmental regu-
lations were adopted, without a constitutional right to a decent 
environment. Yet in 1960 or thereabouts, on the eve of this decade, 
a judge might well have concluded that environmentalists needed, 
as the title of a book by William 0. Douglas put it, A Wilderness 
Bill of Rights. The publicity itself, cause and symptom of growing 
power, spoke of the citizens' powerlessness. 
If a majority of the Supreme Court had made such a mistake, 
and created a right to a decent environment, what would the consti-
tutional historians say about it today? Probably that it was yet an-
other example of the Court's historic role as guardian of the rights 
that politicians neglect. They would be able to show that the Court 
intervened only after many decades of shameful political inaction. 
The Justices ordered the states (let us assume) to adopt minimum 
standards of air and water quality, ushering in one of the most ere-
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ative, tumultuous, and ultimately inspiring decades in the history of 
American government. Prompted by the Court's bold decisions, 
the politicians finally began to respond to the quiet crisis they had 
previously ignored. Although at first they evaded and temporized, 
they eventually fashioned-in creative conflict and finally coopera-
tion with the courts-a solid foundation of environmental law. 
As we now know, such history would have been profoundly 
mistaken: the Court would not have been the cause of the environ-
mental revolution. It would have happened anyway. But the Jus-
tices would have seemed to be the essential catalyst. This points up 
a common fallacy in constitutional history: we almost always as-
sume that if the Court had not acted the problem would not have 
been addressed. In many cases, no doubt, this assumption is accu-
rate. Yet sometimes, by removing an issue from the political arena, 
the Court may have perpetuated the political torpor that the histori-
ans later cited as a justification for its intervention. For example, if 
the Justices had not undertaken to supervise state regulation of in-
terstate commerce, maybe Congress eventually would have created 
an administrative agency for that purpose. This might have been 
superior to judicial review. We cannot know.6 
Today scholars generally define the appropriate occasions for 
judicial restraint by reference to the subject of the case-economic 
regulation, for instance. Thayer had a different approach. He 
thought that the Court should not declare a law unconstitutional 
except when there was no reasonable doubt.7 If he meant that any-
thing which can be defended with a show of reason is constitutional, 
then he went too far. But I wonder whether the Justices have gone 
too far toward the other extreme. Let me return to my complaint 
about a trivial Constitution. Judicial dogmatism is one of the 
causes of trivial rights. I will rephrase Thayer's idea: the problem, 
I suspect, is not that the Justices invalidate laws and practices about 
whose constitutionality they have reasonable doubts; it is that they 
don't always have the doubts that they ought to have. By and large, 
the Court's decisions may more justly be criticized for dogmatism 
than for lawlessness. 
To be sure, trivial rights are also a measure of the security of 
our truly basic liberties. We do not try to burn atheists; so our 
constitutional cases have to do with nativity scenes instead of here-
tics at the stake. Socialists are free to speak, so the constitutional 
frontier becomes nude dancing. 
6. The point was made in Auerbach, supra note 3, at 150-51. 
7. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 
HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893). 
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Symbols are important, and a case may be "merely symbolic" 
without being trivial. Then too, petty rights may be the plate armor 
of great rights, deflecting repression before it reaches the heart of 
our system. 
Still, it is a constitution they are expounding. If the Court 
were to establish a constitutional right to a decent environment it 
would soon be asked to decide precisely how many milligrams per 
liter of various pollutants should be discharged into the Mississippi. 
Legalistic arguments against such decisions would miss the point. 
Thayer said it better. 
IV 
In the academy, constitutional jurisprudence has become ex-
ceedingly sophisticated. One may express reservations, as I have 
done, and certainly one can poke holes in particular theories. But 
on the whole we are entitled to feel superior to columnists, politi-
cians, and other lay commentators. Our political opinions, on the 
other hand, strike me as much less impressive. Precisely because 
constitutional law is indeed partly politics, this is a serious charge. 
Oddly, many modern constitutional thinkers are not interested in 
messy, legislative facts, even though they want the Court to address 
a multitude of social problems. In Brandeis's time, reformers were 
perhaps too inclined to believe that the facts are clear and that they 
speak for themselves. Their mistake, if mistake it was, hardly justi-
fies going to the other extreme, by trying to solve all constitutional 
issues dogmatically. Naive politics is worse than naive law. 
The political side of the New Formalism tends to be uncriti-
cally statist in its treatment of economic regulation. For example, 
to appraise the Lochner era by a political criterion, we need to de-
cide whether the regulations that the conservative Court struck 
down were on the whole good laws. Contrary to what one gathers 
from most histories of that period, the answer is not at all clear.s 
Nor is it clear that we should approve all of the statutes that the 
conservative Court upheld. What about the Muller law, which as 
you know did not apply to men? Or the minimum wage for women 
in Adkins? What about the New Deal laws that the Nine Old Men 
invalidated? Or the ones that they upheld? For example, how 
many teachers of constitutional law discuss the possibility that 
Blaisdell was a harmful decision? I suppose that most of us tacitly 
assume that the decision was right as a matter of economic policy, 
and questionable only by legalistic reasoning. I doubt that we give 
8. See, e.g., Bryden, Brandeis's Facts, I CONST. COMM. 281 (1984). 
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adequate attention to the economic case against mortgage morato-
ria. What if their effect is to make credit more difficult for farmers 
to obtain?9 
In the nonlegal literature, one can find considerable evidence 
that the value of some of these statutes was problematic. Constitu-
tional scholars, on the other hand, generally imply that the laws 
were desirable, but without adducing any evidence. Those who ad-
vocate judicial restraint have an adequate excuse for gliding past the 
legislative issues, but others do not. 
Realists usually stress the indeterminacy of constitutional 
meaning and the manipulability of doctrine. It seems to me that 
most of the issues that come before the Court are at least as difficult 
in their legislative dimension as in their narrowly legal dimension. 
Some scholars, though skeptical of old-fashioned legal reasoning, 
have supreme confidence in their political intuitions, expressed as 
moral imperatives. Their combination of legal nihilism and politi-
cal faith is psychologically understandable. "Tolerance," wrote 
Learned Hand, "is the twin of incredulity." If you think that the 
Fate of Mankind depends on whether your political program is en-
acted, you are likely to regard people like Thayer as excessively 
prissy or even as sinister apologists for the status quo. You are 
likely to favor activism if and only if it advances your causes. If, on 
the other hand, you believe that politics is a quest for the least lousy 
solution; that most plausible theories are wrong; that there are 
plenty of fools and scoundrels in every crowd; and that constitu-
tional decisions are not even close to being one of the major deter-
minants of human happiness, then you are likely to prefer Thayer to 
many more recent constitutional theorists. 
While we are under its spell, the cause of the moment always 
seems to be perfectly valid, long overdue, and terribly important, 
more so than any jurisprudential theory. History sometimes verifies 
that judgment, but it always adds doubts; and often the cause even-
tually looks misguided. Yesterday's enlightened constitutional 
causes included protection of women, eugenics, the minimum wage, 
zoning, and a free hand for the President in foreign affairs. There is 
something to be said for each of these, but not nearly as much as 
liberals once thought. One hopes that our causes will look better to 
our constitutional heirs than these old causes look to us. 
It is a mistake to assume that impersonal legal logic necessarily 
leads to more conservative results than judicial statesmanship. Le-
galism argues against a revival of substantive economic due process. 
9. See Farm Foreclosure Moratoria and the Contract Clause: An Economic Analysis, 3 
CONST. COMM. 331 (1986). 
1986] POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 435 
So does Thayer. But if we reject those grounds for restraint, much 
can be said in favor of economic due process. Although legal schol-
ars customarily invoke a formalistic presumption that companies do 
not need judicial protection, the statute books are loaded with in-
defensible regulations; we sometimes forget that the pro-regulation 
side often represents dominant economic interests. Justices are as 
capable of appraising economic regulations as they are of appraising 
school busing and the like. Although it is customary to distinguish 
"economic" from "human" rights, common people may gain more 
from decisions of which the nominal beneficiaries are companies, 
than from some of the more glamorously egalitarian decisions. 
Since capitalism seems to be the foundation of republican govern-
ment (necessary, though not sufficient),w one might even describe 
economic due process as the preferred freedom. That is, if Thayer 
was wrong. 
Politics, we know, is the art of the possible. Yet the same sort 
of person who believes that law is merely politics usually also be-
lieves that the Supreme Court should have struck down all of the 
anti-subversive laws and practices that came before it after World 
War II. Would that have been politically realistic? To the extent 
that constitutional adjudication is truly political, the Court should 
be (must inevitably be) a fox as well as a lion. The course it actually 
followed was arguably very clever politics: in cases like Yates and 
Scales it fought a guerilla war against repressive legislation instead 
of launching a reckless frontal attack. 
The just compensation clause needs a careful political analysis. 
Literally construed, it seems to prohibit only physical expropria-
tion. On this basis, one might argue that the concept of regulatory 
takings is an unwarranted judicial invention. Here it is the liberals 
who are the strict constructionists. Like other strict construction-
ists, they have a difficult position to defend. The "connotative 
meaning" of the clause, to borrow a term from Paul Freund, is not 
violated by extending it to regulatory takings. What good would it 
do to know that your land cannot be expropriated, if the govern-
ment may prohibit you from using it? (And tax you for owning it.) 
On the other hand, if the concept of regulatory takings is bad 
for society, I see no irresistible legalistic reason for retaining it. The 
distinction between seizing land and prohibiting its use is thin but 
perhaps not altogether unreal, especially if the landowner is allowed 
to camp, to stroll around, and to exclude others, being prohibited 
only from developing the land. We have a genuine interpretive 
choice. 
10. See, e.g., P. BERGER, THE CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1986). 
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If we move to another plane of argument, ethical theory in-
stead of narrow legalism, the issue becomes even more complex. As 
a matter of abstract ethical theory, there are strong arguments on 
both sides. Some say that landowners should have no greater rights 
than those who want to regulate them. By draining your swamp 
you impose upon nature-lovers like me; by putting it in a zoning 
district where drainage and development are forbidden we impose 
upon you. In this political contest, the argument goes, the courts 
should be neutral, even if the zoning law has made the land 
worthless. II 
The main trouble with this argument is that it is unrealistic, 
less as a matter of legal or ethical theory than as a matter of politi-
cal reality.12 As a theoretical exercise, one can devise a plan to pre-
serve a state's environmental amenities by regulation, spreading the 
burden widely enough to make it look tolerably fair, perhaps even 
in those cases where a landowner is left with a nearly worthless 
tract. In most situations, however, this ethical argument will not 
correspond to reality, because what makes it politically feasible to 
do this to a landowner is the fact that the government is not doing it 
to many other landowners, and indeed others are commonly bene-
fitting in some proprietary way from the regulation. The typical 
case of a regulatory taking arises out of parochial zoning, not out of 
a grand plan to redistribute wealth or save the environment. My 
guess is that, typically, the landowner who is left with a nearly 
worthless tract because of a zoning rule has been treated unfairly. 
Others who own equally scenic land, or equally valuable wildlife 
habitat, have been put in a district where development is allowed, or 
have received variances. 
If I am right about all this, then the victims of regulatory tak-
ings are not usually great corporations; they are scattered landown-
ers, affected by different regulations imposed by different local 
governments at different times. These people lack a practical way 
to cooperate politically. They also face legal difficulties: given the 
skimpy records in most zoning offices, discriminatory treatment 
normally will be impossible to prove. Even if the landowner does 
prove it, he probably will not be entitled to relief under the equal 
protection clause of the Federal Constitution.u While we lack ade-
quate equal protection doctrine, the just compensation clause serves 
as a crude technique for preventing some extreme examples of this 
II. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971). 
12. For a more elaborate study and analysis of this subject, see Bryden, A Phantom 
Doctrine: The Origins and Effects of Just v. Marinette County, 1978 A.B.F.R.J. 397. 
13. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). 
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kind of unfairness. Here again, political realism is more "conserva-
tive" than lawyers' logic. And here too, as in Bakke, conservative 
values are in conflict: to protect property rights, one must override 
local decisions. ("Liberal" values are also in conflict, since in other 
contexts liberals usually want to distribute social losses widely.) 
To see the politics in law is not the end of wisdom; it is only the 
beginning. Politicians send millions off to die or be maimed in wars. 
Realistically, that price must sometimes be paid. Nothing could be 
less political, or less realistic, than to suppose that constitutional 
politics does not require the Court to make analogous painful 
choices. Yet those who stress realism the most are often the least 
prone to find moral ambiguity in constitutional choices. A "realist" 
is apt to be someone who, if the Court were to strike down a rent 
control ordinance under the due process clause, would object on the 
ground that rent control helps the poor. (If you don't see my point, 
get thee to a library.) 
Desegregation deserves a careful political analysis. No consti-
tutional decision is more inspiring than Brown v. Board; none at-
tacked a more despicable evil. If constitutional law consists of 
eternal moral truths, then presumably we can all agree that Plessy 
was wrong. If it consists of legal truths that can be fully appre-
hended by lawyers' logic, the correct outcome is much less clear. 
But the legal argument against mandatory segregation was power-
ful-though not as good in Plessy 's time as in 1954. If, on the other 
hand, we approach it as a political problem, Brown and Plessy are 
obviously distinguishable. Political truth is contingent; it is never 
wise to ignore questions of means, effects, and timing. To appraise 
Plessy, we must ask (among other things) whether the races could 
have moved immediately from a master-slave relationship to one of 
complete equality before the law. Was that politically realistic? In 
politics timing is critical, and most idealistic aspirations are unat-
tainable. We must weigh the likely extent and consequences of 
white resistance to decrees forbidding all de jure segregation, at that 
stage of our history. Chief Justice Warren, you may recall, ac-
knowledged in Brown that Plessy may have been right in its time. 
Perhaps "the strange career of Jim Crow" could have been nipped 
in the bud; perhaps not. I am not perfectly sure of the answer, but I 
have the impression that so-called realists do not even consider the 
question. How can that be realistic? 
